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of oil (a structural change) have played a major role in the moderation of GDP. 
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Sometime in the early 1980s, real GDP and inﬂ  ation in 
industrialized countries began to ﬂ  uctuate less widely than 
in the past. Economists have been debating the causes of 
this dramatic change, commonly referred to as the “Great 
Moderation,” ever since (see ﬁ  gures 1 and 2). Broadly speak-
ing, three explanations have been suggested: good luck, 
better monetary policy, and structural changes in the 
economy. Economists of all stripes are interested in which is 
responsible, but monetary policymakers, in particular, need 
to understand the relative importance of each, as they may 
be in a position to keep up the good work.
Good luck refers to the possibility that the remarkably 
benign series of economic shocks that have hit the economy 
in recent years has been the result of nothing other than 
chance. Some economists conjecture that stable oil prices 
have helped to produce these calm waters, because so much 
of industrialized countries’ output requires oil as an input 
to production, and most of these countries import their oil. 
While today’s rising oil prices may seem to spell the end of 
these good times, the percentage change in recent oil prices 
has been much less abrupt than in the 1970s (see ﬁ  gure 3).
If good luck explains the moderation in GDP and inﬂ  ation, 
though, there’s no reason to expect the moderation to last. 
But many economists argue that better macroeconomic poli-
cies are responsible, particularly monetary policy. If better 
monetary policy has helped to moderate swings in GDP 
and inﬂ  ation, it is important to make sure that this good 
policy continues. 
Inﬂ  ation targeting is seen by some as the best way to do 
this. A credible target on low inﬂ  ation helps central banks 
to stabilize not only inﬂ  ation but also inﬂ  ation expectations, 
which by themselves can be a source of macroeconomic 
instability, as they can affect interest rates and the real 
economy. Over the past few decades, most of the world’s 
major central banks have sought to keep inﬂ  ation low, some 
going so far as to adopt explicit inﬂ  ation targeting regimes, 
and proponents of inﬂ  ation targeting see the Great Modera-
tion as evidence of these policies’ effectiveness.
Other economists argue that the overall economy has under-
gone some sort of structural change and is now intrinsically 
more resilient to economic shocks. A look at the effect of oil 
prices on the economy provides an example of this resil-
ience. Since 1983, increases in oil prices have had a much 
smaller effect on GDP—in the United States as well as most 
industrialized countries. Oil conservation efforts after the 
oil-price shocks of the 1970s are likely responsible for this 
reduced impact, for we now use oil more efﬁ  ciently. The 
ratio of oil to GDP, which shows how much oil is needed to 
produce a given dollar of GDP, has fallen about 40 percent 
since the 1965–1983 period. 
My recent research with Antón Nakov suggests that none of 
these explanations by itself accounts for all of the modera-
tion in GDP and inﬂ  ation variability, but each contributes 
something. We have quantiﬁ  ed the impact of these causes 
on the moderation, and we ﬁ  nd that while better monetary 
policy explains most of the moderation in inﬂ  ation, good 
luck and the less-intensive use of oil (a structural change) 
have played a major role in the moderation of GDP. 
The Oil Channel
In the past six years, oil prices have increased almost $80 a 
barrel (from an average of $20 in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2002 
to $98 in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2008). Unlike the 1970s, this 
dramatic price rise has not been associated with an increase 
in inﬂ  ation or a deceleration in economic activity. In the 
1970s, the skyrocketing price of crude oil (it tripled in 1973 
and then doubled between 1979 and 1980) was accompanied 
by two-digit inﬂ  ation rates and deteriorating GDP growth 
in the United States and many other industrialized, oil-im-
porting countries. It all culminated in three recessions within 
a span of ten years, the last of which (1981–1982) was the 
most severe recession in the United States since the 1930s. 
The textbook explanation of the relationship between oil 
prices and economic activity assumes that when oil prices 
change, it will affect output and prices. A change in the price 
of oil is considered an aggregate supply shock, similar to Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Haver Analytics.
Note: Calculated using the GDP deﬂ  ator. 
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a change in total factor productivity. When oil becomes more 
expensive (and thus is used less in production), both labor and 
capital are made less productive. Therefore, a price increase 
leads to less output, and, if the money supply is held constant, 
higher prices for consumer goods.
Empirical work of the 1980s that analyzed the relationship of 
GDP growth and oil-price variations seemed to conﬁ  rm the 
textbook interpretation. For example, in his seminal 1983 paper 
on the topic, James Hamilton observed that every postwar U.S. 
recession but one had been preceded by an increase in the price 
of crude oil, and he asserted a causal relationship from oil prices 
to GDP. Other authors found similar evidence of a link between 
oil prices and consumer prices and oil prices and GDP in the 
United States, as well as oil and consumer prices in other devel-
oped countries (see ﬁ  gures 4 and 5).
But studies after the 1980s produced mixed evidence: 
Mark Hooker found that after 1981, increases in oil prices had 
a smaller effect on GDP than before 1981. Similarly, Olivier 
Blanchard and Jordi Gali documented an important change in 
the transmission mechanism of oil shocks to economic activity 
and inﬂ  ation in most industrialized countries. In particular, they 
found that the correlation between oil prices and U.S. GDP over 
the past 10 years has not been negative, as the textbook inter-
pretation of an oil supply shock would imply, but positive (and 
moderately strong).
That oil affects the U.S. economy now less than during the 
1970s is probably explained by the fact that, as I noted earlier, 
oil is used less intensively now. Because oil is less important as 
an input to production than it was three decades ago, increases 
in its price affect the productivity of labor and capital less than 
before. As a result, the relationship between oil prices and eco-
nomic activity is likely to look less strong.
On the other hand, the explanation for why comovements of oil 
prices and U.S. GDP should have changed must lie somewhere 
else. Most existing theoretical work on the relationship between 
oil and the macroeconomy supposes that oil prices ﬂ  uctuate for 
reasons that are independent of normal macroeconomic condi-
tions. Rather, an oil well dries up, a pipeline is damaged by an 
ice storm, or a cartel decides it can get away with limiting supply 
to increase prices. By supposing the independence of oil prices 
from the macroeconomy, changes in oil prices can be interpreted 
only according to the textbook explanation, as a supply shock 
that impinges on people’s ability to produce and buy goods and 
services and leads to a negative correlation between oil prices 
and output. 
But in actuality, oil prices are also affected by the demand for 
oil, which makes them dependent on (and pretty reactive to) 
conditions in the world economic environment. It is therefore 
not accurate to interpret every oil-price change as a shock from 
nowhere hitting the economy, for sometimes it may be the 
consequence of some underlying shock—such as a technological 
or ﬁ  nancial innovation—which ultimately affects consumers’ de-
mand for oil. When we assume that oil prices change in response 
to other economic factors, we can see that every shock that has a 
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Quarterly annualized percent changegenerate a positive comovement of GDP and oil prices. 
What this means for the issue we are considering is that 
we will need a model that can tell the difference between 
oil-price increases that are caused by shocks to the oil supply 
(like hurricane Katrina) and those caused by changes in the 
demand for oil. In order to quantify the relative importance 
of good luck, good policy, and structural economic change, 
our model must be able to disentangle these two possible 
causes of changing oil prices, so that the independent contri-
butions of each to the moderation can be measured.
Quantifying the Moderation’s Possible Causes
In recent work, Anton Nakov and I investigated causes of 
recent U.S. macroeconomic stability. We estimated how 
much of it could be attributed to a reduction in the mag-
nitude of shocks stemming directly from the oil sector and 
how much to the increased efﬁ  ciency with which we use oil 
in production. To do this we took a microfounded model of 
the U.S. economy that is commonly used to analyze optimal 
monetary policy and augmented it with a foreign oil sector. 
This sector is characterized by a dominant producer (like 
OPEC in the real world) and a competitive fringe of smaller, 
capacity-constrained oil producers. These upgrades mean 
that our model incorporates the dependency of oil prices on 
other economic factors and takes into account the fact that 
the oil sector is not a perfectly competitive industry. 
We combined this augmented model with macroeconomic 
data to produce a model of the U.S. economy before and 
after 1984. Then we performed counterfactual simulations 
to see how the economy would have behaved under differ-
ent conditions, for example, had the oil–output ratio been 
different when an oil supply shock hit. 
Results of all our simulations tell us that the moderation 
of U.S. GDP and inﬂ  ation is substantially due to better 
monetary policy (especially for inﬂ  ation) and smaller shocks 
hitting the economy (especially for GDP). While the latter 
result seems to support the good luck explanation, we could 
get the same result if permanent structural changes, such as 
the growing importance of the service sector, have altered 
the intrinsic volatility of GDP, inﬂ  ation, or other aspects of 
the U.S. economy. 
On the other hand, our approach does allow us to quantify 
the role of the oil sector: Our results tell us that shocks 
stemming from the oil industry (such as disruptions or the 
exhaustion of supply, innovations in extraction technology, 
or changes in the big oil producers’ market power) have 
only partially subsided, by about 15 percent, and this mod-
eration of shocks has contributed to a 6 percent reduction in 
GDP volatility and a 10 percent reduction in inﬂ  ation vola-
tility. The primary effect of this moderation in oil-industry 
shocks is that real oil prices are now less volatile, by about 
20 percent.
As I mentioned earlier, the U.S. economy has reduced its 
reliance on oil considerably. We ﬁ  nd that this structural 
change has contributed signiﬁ  cantly to the U.S. economy’s 











GDP growth 1.126 0.508 55
Inﬂ  ation 0.609 0.244 60
Interest rate 0.847 0.583 31
Real oil price 
change 16.33 12.99 20
Note: Variability is calculated as the standard deviation multiplied by 100. 
Source: Nakov and Pescatori. 2007.
Notes: Estimates of implicit price deﬂ  ators at current prices in national 
currency. Data are annual.
Source: United Nations statistics division.
5. Inﬂ  ation, Developed Countries
Note: Data are quarterly.
Source: United Nations statistics division.
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ability to insulate itself from oil-industry-related shocks. The 
reduction of the oil–GDP ratio, from 0.036 in 1965–1983 
to 0.022 in 1984–2006, accounts for about 10 percent of 
the moderation in GDP growth volatility and 25 percent of 
inﬂ  ation’s. In other words, if the U.S. economy of the 1970s 
operated at our current level of oil intensity, GDP would 
have been 10 percent less volatile and inﬂ  ation would have 
been 25 percent less volatile. (For more detail, see “Oil and 
the Great Moderation,” in the Recommended Readings.) One 
curious effect of this same reduction in U.S. oil intensity is 
its effect on nominal oil prices: Everything equal, nominal oil 
prices ﬂ  uctuate more widely now, by about 0.5 percent. 
Signiﬁ  cant increases in oil prices can be a difﬁ  cult blow for 
modern economies to absorb and recover from. But it ap-
pears we are getting better at making our economies more re-
silient. Better monetary policy has kept inﬂ  ation in check in 
the United States and other developed countries, and helped 
to moderate ﬂ  uctuations in output. We have reduced our reli-
ance on oil, and as a result, the U.S. economy is much better 
insulated today against shocks coming from the oil industry 
than in the past. 
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